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Abstract. The proliferation of sensing devices create plethora of data-
streams, which in turn can be harnessed to carry out sophisticated ana-
lytics to support various real-time applications and services as well as
long-term planning, e.g., in the context of intelligent cities or smart
homes to name a few prominent ones. A mature cloud infrastructure
brings such a vision closer to reality than ever before. However, we be-
lieve that the ability for data-owners to flexibly and easily to control the
granularity at which they share their data with other entities is very im-
portant - in making data owners feel comfortable to share to start with,
and also to leverage on such fine-grained control to realize different busi-
ness models or logics. In this paper, we explore some basic operations to
flexibly control the access on a data stream and propose a framework eX-
ACML+ that extends OASIS’s XACML model [1] to achieve the same.
We develop a prototype using the commercial StreamBase engine [2] to
demonstrate a seamless combination of stream data processing with (a
small but important selected set of) fine-grained access control mecha-
nisms, and study the framework’s efficacy based on experiments in cloud
like environments.
1 Introduction
Wide-scale deployments of sensors and smart mobile devices, as well as emerging
technologies and trends such as Internet of Things (IoT) and participatory sens-
ing - all envision developing interesting real-time data stream driven applications
not only based on the isolated data-streams generated by individual sources, but
also by mashing them up together to generate more sophisticated services. Such
services vary in scale and scope - from smart homes to intelligent cities 1, which
may fuse together data all owned by a single owner or from many parties. The
pervasive cloud infrastructure is an important catalyst in enabling such visions,
because (i) it is cost effective [3] for individual data owners since it provides
the necessary computational and storage resources elastically, (ii) it allows fast
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1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligent_cities
prototyping, deployment and testing of new applications and analytics at large-
scale, and equally importantly, (iii) by naturally achieving collocation of data
from different sources that may be needed to build such complex applications,
it reduces the barriers of sharing and collaboration.
For example, a flu outbreak within one or several cities can be tracked, stud-
ied (and necessary intervention measures taken) using real-time data from say
hospitals, transport departments, weather stations, as well as telecom compa-
nies. In the pre-cloud era, finding and sharing such data would encounter several
layers of barriers.
However, in order to facilitate meaningful sharing of data from data-owners
to various users, it is crucial that the data-owners have adequate controls on
what they wish to share and with whom. Such controls are desirable for several
reasons, including maintaining ownership of data, privacy of content selectively,
as well as monetization of the data by differentiated pricing and exposing data
in different details to different users. In absence of fine-grained control, or if
the control comes only at prohibitive costs (either in negotiating, interpreting
or implementing), then it is more than likely that the data-owners would just
decide to not share. In our previous work [4], we have proposed some simple
extensions to XACML [1] to represent and enforce fine-grained access controls
(such as time-window based aggregation, trigger/threshold based access, etc.) on
archived data, i.e., data stored in a relational database. In this paper, we look
at the relatively harder problem on how to achieve similar fine-grained access
control on data-streams.
Thus, while the sharing predicates we explore remain the same as in our
previous work, the main challenges and contributions of the current work is
precisely to deal with data-streams, which rely on fundamentally different set
of technologies than data stored in a RDBMS. Developing access control model
and mechanism on data streams is more challenging due to the characteristics
of stream data and Data Stream Management System (DSMS).
- The data model used in DSMS are fundamentally different from those used
in traditional RDBMS. DSMS deals with unbounded and fast changing time-
series tuples in data streams. Access control enforcement, particularly when it is
based on the content (such as, say a value based trigger or range predicate) is not
a one-time operation, but a continuous procedure applied on the data streams.
Whenever a new data tuple arrives, corresponding access control actions must
be taken on it. Therefore, models and technologies developed for access control
enforcement on RDBMS such as those in [5] cannot be readily adapted for DSMS.
- Temporal constraints, i.e., sliding windows, plays a crucial role in DSMS. In
addition to normal constraints such as selection and projection, window-based
aggregate operations into the access control model also needs to be considered.
In this work we propose the eXACML+ framework, by extending our previ-
ous work on fine-grained access control in RDBMS, namely eXACML [4], which
in itself extends the popular XACML [1] standard. The eXACML+ framework
adds fine-grained access control to a popular data stream management model,
namely the Aurora model[6]. The main contributions of this paper are:
1. We extend XACML to enable fine-grained access control for continuous
queries [7], i.e., standing queries which are continuously processing new incoming
data streams. We express the fine-grain access control policies within obligations
blocks of XACML policies and make the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) gen-
erate corresponding continuous queries from the obligations provides the Policy
Decision Point (PDP) grant the access.2 These continuous queries are expressed
as query graphs and are sent to back-end DSMS for processing. We refer to this
approach as XACML+.
2. We integrate the various components in the eXACML+ framework. The
framework consists of entities including data server, XACML+ instances, proxy
server and client interface. Users send requests for data streams together with
customized continuous queries and obtain stream handles, which point to the
unique resource identifiers (URIs) of the processed data streams from the frame-
work.
3. We show that customized queries issued by users, if not taken care of care-
fully, can give rise to information leak in case of sliding window policies (which
our framework can detect and prevent). We also discuss possible improvements
to the system efficiency by informing users of empty/partial results due to policy
and query mismatches.
4. We instantiate the eXACML+ framework using Aurora’s commercialized
software StreamBase [2] as the back-end DSMS. We evaluate the performance of
our prototype in a cloud-like environment. The results indicate that the frame-
work incurs relatively constant overhead and is scalable.
The current work assumes a trusted cloud service provider, which itself has
access to all the stored data, and furthermore honestly enforces the sharing con-
straints specified by the data-owners. Content confidentiality from the cloud ser-
vice provider itself, and the service provider’s accountability are also important
and much researched topics, which are necessary extensions for the presented
work but are out of the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes details
of XACML+,i.e., our extension to XACML to support stream data. Section 3
discusses the design of the eXACML+ framework. The prototype and evaluation
of the framework are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses related work in
the relevant research area and finally we conclude our work and propose future
work in Section 6.
2 XACML policies for Stream Data
2.1 Overview of XACML and Aurora Model
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language [1] is a OASIS framework for
specifying and enforcing access control. Policies are written in XML and contain
elements including subjects, resources , actions, obligations, etc.. The framework
2 PEP and PDP are standard terms associated with XACML technology stack, and
will be described in detail in next Section.
consists two main components: a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and a Policy En-
forcement Point (PEP). The former manages policies and evaluate user requests
against the stored policies, the result of which are permit or deny decisions.
PEP’s main role is to marshall user requests and the PDP results. In addition
to permit/deny decision, the PDP also returns a set of obligations to the PEP.
We extend this process for fine-grained access control by embedding parts of the
policies in obligations which are then processed by the PEP.
Aurora[6] is a popular model for stream data, which has matured into a
commercial product, i.e. the StreamBase engine[2]. In this model, a data stream
consists of an append-only sequence of tuples with the same schema. A query
on a data stream is modelled as a directed acyclic graph,which we refer as query
graph, of operators (also called boxes). The query graph is applied to each tuple
from the stream such each tuple in the output data stream satisfies all predicates
in the query graph. StreamBase also comes with support for StreamSQL,which
is SQL-like representation of query graphs.
The Aurora model supports a number of operators (or boxes), but in this
work we focus on three common ones: filter (selection), map (projection) and
window based aggregation (aggregate functions applied on sliding windows). A
filter operator has a condition C — a boolean expression composed of logic
operators (AND, OR, NOT ), equality and inequality operators (<,>,≤,≥,=
, 6=). A map operator contains a set of projected attributes S. A window-based
aggregation operator consists of the sliding window (specified by the window
type, size, advance step), the set of attributes and the aggregate functions to be
computed over each window.
2.2 Fine-grained Access Control Policies
To better illustrate our access control model for stream data, we use the following
example throughout the paper.
Example 1. The National Environmental Agency (NEA) wishes to provide real-
time weather data service through the Cloud platform. The data has the schema
(samplingtime, temperature, humidity, solar radiation, rain rate, wind speed,
wind direction, barometer) and is generated every thirty seconds by a weather
station. Instead of creating one customised data stream for each individual cus-
tomer, NEA decides to use the cloud’s access control mechanism. Benefits of
this approach has been discussed in [4]. The Land Transport Authority (LTA)
is developing an automatic warning system that alerts drivers of possible traffic
congestions due to heavy rain. The warning system requires real-time weather
data from NEA which specifies the following policy: 1) only samplingtime, rain
rate, and wind speed data are visible 2) data should come in windows of size
5 and advance step of size 2, and the functions applied on samplingtime, rain
rate and wind speed are lastValue, average and maximum, respectively 3) data
is visible only when the rain rate is greater than 5mm/hour.
Figure 1 shows the Aurora query graph that transforms the original weather
data stream so that it satisfy the above access control scenario. Using the
Fig. 1. Aurora query graph for the example in section 2.2
Description Obligation Id
Filter exacml:obligation:stream-filtering
Map exacml:obligation:stream-mapping
Window-Based Aggregation exacml:obligation:stream-window-aggregation
Table 1. Obligation types
obligation-based approach described in [4], we create new obligation elements,
each for every operator (listed in table 1). The detailed information of each
obligation element is as follows:
1. Filter: consists of a string attribute with attribute ID: exacml:obligation:stream-
filter-condition-id. The value is a string representing a boolean expression used
as the filter condition C.
2. Map: consists of a set of string attributes with ID: exacml:obligation:stream-
map-attribute-id. The values are attribute names, used used to restrict access to
only authorized attributes, such as rain rate and wind speed in the example.
3. Window-Based Aggregation: consists a number of attributes:
- Window type: string attribute with attribute id: exacml:obligation:stream-
window-type-id. It specifies if the window size is based on number of tuples or
number of time unit.
- Window size: integer attribute with attribute id: exacml:obligation:stream-
window-size-id. It specifies the size of the window in the number of tuples or
time units.
- Window advance step: integer attribute with attribute id: exacml:obligation:stream-
window-step-id. It specifies how fast the window advances on the stream.
- Aggregation attribute: string attribute with attribute id: exacml:obligation:stream-
window-attr-id. It specifies the attribute in the data stream schema that is to
be aggregated, and what the aggregate function is. Its value is of the form
attribute-id:aggregate-function, where attribute-id is the name of the attribute
and aggregate-function is an element from the set of aggregate functions {Avg,
Max, Min, Count, LastValue, FirstValue,...}.
Once we have defined the individual obligation elements, we can combine
them to form the obligations block of the XACML policy for the access scenario.
Figure 2 shows how these obligation elements are used in the policy.
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="exacml:obligation:stream-filter" FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-filter-condition-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">rainrate > 5 </AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
<Obligation ObligationId="exacml:obligation:stream-map" FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-map-attribute-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">samplingtime</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-map-attribute-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">rainrate</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-map-attribute-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">windspeed</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
<Obligation ObligationId="exacml:obligation:stream-window" FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-window-step-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">2</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-window-size-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">5</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-window-type-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">tuple</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-window-attr-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">samplingtime:lastval</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-window-attr-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">rainrate:avg</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="pCloud:obligation:stream-window-attr-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">windspeed:max</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
Fig. 2. Obligation portion of the XACML policy for the example in section 2.2
3 The eXACML+ Framework
We describe in this section the design of the eXACML+ framework which is a
natural extension of the eXACML with additional functionality to manage Au-
rora query graphs and customised queries issued by users. The architecture of
eXACML+ resembles that of eXACML except that: 1) New XACML+ instances
are added into the framework to handle access control needs on data streams and
2)Update on the policy management module in response to the change of data
model. Figure 3(a) illustrates the architecture of eXACML+. It includes enti-
ties such as cloud server, XACML+ and XACML* instances, proxy with cache
feature and client interface. We will also include discussion on two important
issues which have not been discussed in the original eXACML framework, which
are 1) why allowing multiple windows on the same data stream could cause vi-
olation of data privacy and 2) how do we alert users if their queries contradict
with the access control policies enforced on the data streams and could cause
empty/partial result sets eventually.
(a) eXACML+ (b) XACML+
Fig. 3. Architecture of XACML+ and eXACML+ framework
3.1 Handling User Query
In many cases, the data stream accessible by the user may not directly fit the
actual requirement. In our example, suppose that the LTA later finds out that
only rain rate over 50mm/hr has influence on traffic condition, plus the warning
system only need the data from sliding windows of size 10 (instead of the original
5 tuples). The LTA could process the incoming data steam locally. However, hav-
ing such additional filtering done by a server (the cloud) is more preferable. In
our framework, the user sends a customised query to the PEP. The query acts as
a request to apply additional operation on the authorized stream. We implement
the query in XML form, as shown in Figure 4(a). The PEP transforms this into
an Aurora query graph similar to that in Figure 1, and then combines it with
the query graph derived from the policy obligations. One could simply concate-
nate the two graphs, but properly merging them together gains advantages such
as reducing the number of operators in query graph and therefore improving
efficiency. It also allows for detection of empty/partial result (which we refer to
as NR and PR). Merging two query graphs is equivalent to merging each type
of operators in the graphs. We explain how NR and PR can be detected during
the merging process later in Section 3.5. The rules for merging individual types
of operators are:
- Two filter operators F1 and F2 with condition C1 and C2 are merged into
a filter F3 with the condition C3 = (C1) AND (C2). There are cases that C3 can
be further simplified. For example, if C1 = x > v1 and C2 = x > v2, C3 can be
written as x > v2 iff v2 ≥ v1.
- Two map operator M1 and M2 with attribute sets S1 and S2 are merged
into new operator M3 with the attribute set S3 = S1 ∪ S2.
.- Two window-based aggregation operator A1 and A2 are merged only if
the following conditions are met: 1) window types are the same 2) suppose A1
is derived the policy obligations and A2 from user query, A1’s window size and
advance step are must be less than or equal to those of A2. The second condition
<UserQuery>
<Stream name="weather" />
<Filter>
<FilterCondition>
RainRate > 50
</FilterCondition>
</Filter>
<Map>
<Attribute>RainRate</Attribute>
</Map>
<Aggregation>
<WindowType>tuple</WindowType>
<WindowSize>10<WindowSize>
<WindowStep>2<WindowStep>
<Attribute>avg(RainRate)</Attribute>
</Aggregation>
</UserQuery>
(a) User Query in XML
CREATE INPUT STREAM weather (
samplingtime timestamp , temperature double ,
humidity double , rainrate double ,
windspeed double,winddirection int,
barometer double );
CREATE STREAM internal_0;
SELECT * FROM weather WHERE rainrate > 50 INTO internal_0;
CREATE OUTPUT STREAM internal_1;
SELECT internal_0.samplingtime,internal_0.rainrate,
FROM internal_0 INTO internal_1;
CREATE OUTPUT STREAM output;
CREATE WINDOW _10tuple( SIZE 10 ADVANCE 2 TUPLES);
SELECT lastval(samplingtime) AS lastvalsamplingtime,
avg(rainrate) AS avgrainrate
FROM internal_1[_10tuple] INTO output;
(b) StreamSQL statements
Fig. 4. User Query and StreamSQL
is to ensure that user are not given more fine grained data than permitted by the
policy. The new operator A3 will have the same window type as A1 and A2, and
the window size and advance step are the same as those of A2. The aggregation
function and attribute sets are the intersection of those from A1 and A2.
Figure 4(b) shows the StreamSQL statements after merging the query graph
in Figure 1 with user query in Figure 4(a).
3.2 Design of XACML+
Figure 3(b) shows the design of XACML+, which is an extension of the original
oasis XACML model [1]. The work-flow is as follows:
1. PEP receives a user’s request for accessing a stream, together with a
customized query, which are then forwarded to the PDP. The customised query
is also converted into a Aurora query graph.
2. PDP evaluates the request against the stream’s policies and returns the
decision and obligations (if any) to the PEP. If the decision is Permit, PEP will
generate a query graph from the obligations.
3. PEP checks that for the credentials included the request, no query is
currently being applied to the same data stream. The reason for this is given in
Section 3.4.
4. PEP merges the two query graphs derived from obligations and user query,
during which PR or NR are checked.
5. If there is no PR or NR warning detected, the merged query graph is
converted into a StreamSQL script and sent to the data stream engine. A handle,
in the URI form, is returned to the user.
3.3 Query Graph Management
In the original eXACML framework that handles only bounded data, PDP is
always called whenever a data request is received and only when the decision
is ’Permit’, SQL queries are generated from obligations and sent to database
to retrieve data. This work flow guarantees that removing or updating a policy
does not affect the privacy of the data owner. However, this is not the case when
dealing with unbounded stream data. Instead of actual data, only a handle used
to retrieve the actual data stream from data stream engine is returned as the
response to user’s request. The user then use this handle to connect to the back-
end data stream engine for data streams. If the data stream owner for some
reason has removed or modified the policy that grants the user for a particular
data stream, the user may still connected to the data stream though he is not
supposed to be able to access the data stream any longer.
To solve this issue, we need to in-cooperate query graph management into
the framework. In additional to keeping track of policies loaded, data server also
keeps track of query graphs that are generated by PEP and have already been
sent to back-end data stream engines. In current eXACML+ design, whenever a
policy has been removed or modified by user, all query graphs that are spawned
by the policy are immediately withdrawn from back-end data stream engines.
This may not be a flexible solution, but it ensures data privacy and is not easy
to be compromised.
3.4 Multiple Aggregation Windows
As described in Section 3.2, only a single access is permitted on a particular
data stream for one user at any time. We justify this constraint by showing a
example in which one can reconstruct the raw data steam by combining outputs
from multiple aggregation windows of different window sizes or advance steps.
Example 2. Suppose we have a single-attribute stream S = a0,a1,a2,a3 ,a4,a5...,
an. The access control policy for S allows for aggregation window w, where
w.size = 3, w.advancestep = 2, w.type = tuple, w.attribute=a and w.function
=sum. An user can request an aggregation window v using a customised query,
provided that v.size>=w.size,v.advancestep >= w.advancestep, v.type = w.type,
v.attribute = w.attribute and v.function = w.function. If multiple accesses are al-
lowed, the user can obtain multiple result stream using different v simultaneously.
Let v1.size = 3, v2.size = 4, v3.size = 5 and all other window specifications be
identical to w, the framework will return the user three aggregated data streams
S1, S2 and S3, such that:
S1 = (a0+a1+a2), (a2+a3+a4),(a4+a5+a6), ...
S2 = (a0+a1+a2+a3),(a2+a3+a4+a5),(a4+a5+a6+a7),...
S3 = (a0+a1+a2+a3+a4),(a2+a3+a4+a5+a6), ...
By computing S2 - S1 and S3 - S2 , we obtain two new streams S
′
= a3,a5,a7,...
and S
′′
= a4,a6,a8,... Merging S
′
and S
′′
, we can reconstruct all of the original
stream except for first three tuples.
In general, given a set of result streams derived from different aggregation
windows with fixed advance step M and different window size N, N+1, N+2,..,
N+M, we can reconstruct the original stream from the Nth tuple. The inductive
proof is as following:
Suppose we have three sum aggregation windows with sizes N , N + Q1,
N + Q2, where Q1 < Q2, and a fix step size M , the first k tuples of the
three streams are: S0 =(a0 + ... + aN−1),(aM + ... +aN+M−1),...,(akM + ...
+aN+kM−1); S1 =(a0 + ... + aN+Q1−1),(aM + ... +aN+M+Q1−1),...,(akM + ...
+aN+kM+Q1−1);S2 =(a0 + ... + aN+Q2−1),(aM + ... +aN+M+Q2−1),...,(akM +
... +aN+kM+Q2−1). Let T1 = S1 - S0 and T2 = S2 - S1, we can have T1=(aN
+...+aN+Q1−1),..., (aN+kM+...+aN+kM+Q1−1) and T2=(aN+Q1 +...+aN+Q2−1),...,
(aN+kM+Q1+...+aN+kM+Q2−1).
In a similar fashion, we can construct subsequence streams until Ti such
that Ti=(aN+Qi−1+...+aN+Qj−1), ...,(aN+kM+Qi−1 + ... + aN+kM+Qj−1 ). Let
Q1=1 ,Qj=Qi+1, i.e., each window contains one more element than previous
windows, and Qj < M , we can simplify T1 to Ti as: T1=aN ,aN+M ,...,aN+kM ,
T2=aN+1,aN+M+1,...,aN+kM+1,...,TM=aN+M−1,aN+2M−1,...,aN+(k+1)M−1. Com-
bine T1 to TM in an interleavemanner, we can obtain stream aN ,aN+1,...,aN+(k+1)M−1,
which is the original stream except for first (N-1) tuples.
3.5 Checking for Empty or Partial Result Set (NR/PR)
As mentioned earlier, NR and PR warnings occur while the framework merge
two query graphs. Since all query graphs in our context are built with filter, map
and window based aggregation operators, we simplify this problem by checking
how merging individual operators causes NR/PR cases. Let us first present the
detailed definitions of NR and PR and an example of NR/PR cases.
Partial Result Warning(PR): A system issued warning, stating that some
tuples in the requested stream may not be returned to the user due to conflict
between the user query and some policies enforced on the streams.
Empty Result Warning(NR): A system issued warning, stating that none of
the tuples in the request stream will be returned to the user due to conflict
between the user query and some policies enforced on the streams. This must
be differed from the case where the user does not have access to the stream.
Example 3. Suppose we have a stream S with single attribute a and filter con-
dition F1: a > 8 from policy obligation, filter condition F2: a > 5 is from user
query. Let a part of S be (..., 9,10,11,3,2,6,9,8,7,2,13,...), the user query expects
output to be like, (...,9,10,11,6,9,8,7,13,...). However, due to F1, tuples like 6,8,7
are filtered out and the actual stream the user will get is (... 9,10,11,9,13,...). In
this case, a PR warning will be issued to the user stating that there are possi-
bilities that some tuples that fit his requirement are not returned to him due to
certain access control policies enforced on the data stream. If we change F1 to
be a < 4, only 3,2,2 will be retained after applying F1 on S. Clearly, any real
number less than 4 is never greater than 5, so none of the tuples will make a > 5
true. In another word, predicate “a < 4 AND a > 5” will always be false no
matter what value a may take. Therefore, none of the tuples will be returned to
the user and a NR warning will be issued.
Now let us look at how to generate NR/PR warning for each operator:
Map Operator : Suppose we have two map operators: M1 from policy and
M2 from user query with attribute sets S1 and S2. If S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, alert NR.
Otherwise, alert PR if S1 6= S2.
Aggregate Operator : Suppose we have two aggregation operators A1 and
A2, where A1 comes from the policy and A2 comes from user query.We ap-
ply following rules: (1)If A1.size > A2.size, alert NR;(2)If A1.advancestep >
A2.advancestep, alert NR;(3)If A1.type 6= A2.type, alert NR;(4)If different ag-
gregation functions are applied for the same attribute in A1 and A2, alert
NR;(5)For every attribute a in A2, if a is an attribute in A1 and the aggre-
gation functions applied to a in both A1 and A2 are the same, do not alert;(6)In
all other cases, alert PR.
Filter Operator : Checking if merging two filter operators gives rise to NR
or PR warnings is more complicated. We first define two terms: (1)a simple
expression S is an expression of the form “x op v”, where x is a variable(in our
case, an attribute name of a stream schema), op ∈ {<,>,≥,≤,=, 6=},and v is a
number, or a string (only when op is = or 6=). (2)A complex expression C is an
logical predicate that is formed by connecting simple expressions with NOT, OR
or AND. In our case, C is the filter condition of a filter operator that belongs to
a policy or a user query.
Suppose we have two filter operators F1 and F2 with condition C1 and C2
respectively. Following procedure is used to do the check:
x op v x op’ v
x > v x ≤ v
x < v x ≥ v
x ≥ v x < v
x ≤ v x > v
x = v x 6= v
x 6= v x = v
Table 2. Rules to Convert NOT (x op v ) to x op
′
v
Step 1: Let P = C1 AND C2. Eliminate NOT operator in P using De Mor-
gan’s laws and rules listed in table 2. Let the result expression be P1.
Step 2: Convert P1 into its disjunctive normal form (DNF) P2. Note each
variable S in P2 is a simple expression. The conversion is done by first change
P1 to its postfix form and then evaluate the postfix expression, the algorithms
of which are standard stack based algorithms and can be found easily in places
such as in [8]. While doing the postfix evaluation, if the operator is AND, apply
distribution law on the two operands. If the operator is OR , concatenate two
operands with OR.
Step 3: Check for NR and PR in P2, by pair-wisely calling function check-
TwoSimpleExpression on each two S within the same conjunctive expression.
If any function call returns with NR or PR, mark the whole conjunctive ex-
pression with NR or PR. If all conjunctive expressions are marked with PR or
NR, alert PR or NR, respectively. The cost of the whole procedure is bound
by O(kn2),where k is the number of conjunctive expressions in P2 and n is the
maximum number of S in a single conjunctive expression.
The function checkTwoSimpleExpression takes as inputs two simple expres-
sions S1 and S2. Apparently, checking is only necessary when S1.x = S2.x. Since
there are six possible values of op ∈ {<,>,≤,≥,=, 6=}, we need to do 62 com-
parisons to include all cases that op may take in S1 and S2. For each comparison,
there are three cases, i.e., S1.v > S2.v, S1.v < S2.v and S1.v = S2.v. We show
here an example of how to generate NR and PR alerts for one comparison. Let
S1 = x ≥ v1 and S2 = x ≤ v2, Figure 5 shows how the warnings are produced
given different values of v1 and v2 and Example 4 better illustrates how the
whole procedure works.
Fig. 5. Checking PR/NR for S1 = x ≥ v1 and S1 = x ≤ v2
Example 4. Suppose we have C1 =(a>20 AND a<30) OR NOT(a 6=40), C2 =
NOT(a≥10) AND b=20.
First, we eliminate NOT in P = C1 AND C2 as described in Step 1. After
elimination, we have P1 = (a>20 AND a<30) OR a=40 AND a<10 AND b=20.
To make it easier to read, we use following substitutions: Let A be a > 20, B
be a < 30, C be a = 40, D be a < 10, E be b = 20, & be AND, ‖ be OR. P1 is
then changed to ((A&B)‖C)&(D&E)
Then we convert P1 to its postfix form, which is A B & C ‖ D E & &, and
evaluate it as described in Step 2. After evaluation, we will have P2= E & D &
C ‖ E & D & B & A, which is in CNF and has identical truth table as P1.
In Step 3, we pair-wisely apply function checkTwoSimpleExpression on simple
expressions of the two conjunctive expressions in P2, which are e1 = E & D
& C and e2 = E & D & B & A. For e1, C
2
3 = 3 calls are made on simple
expression pairs (E,D), (E,C) and (D,C). For e2, C
2
4 = 6 calls are made on
(E,D),(E,B),(E,A),(D,B),(D,A) and (B,A). Among all these function calls, (D,C)
returns NR as a¡10 and a=40 cannot be true for any given a value. Similarly,
function calls on (D,A) also returns NR as a<10 and a>20 contradicts. Both
e1 and e2 cannot be true for any a value, means that e1‖e2, whose truth table
is identical to P1 and P2, cannot be true for any a value. In this case, a NR
warning will be returned to the user, stating that some predicates in his query
contradicts with some predicates in the police and no result will be produced
even if he has been granted access to the target stream.
4 Prototype and Evaluation
4.1 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of eXACML+ in Java. We use APIs pro-
vided by StreamBase to manage and query data streams. Communications be-
tween clients, proxies and servers are socket-based. For XACML+, we extended
sun’s XACML implementation [9] , which is an open source Java project for the
XACML standard. The prototype supports access control over data streams by
dynamic managing query graphs generated from user query and policies.
4.2 System Evaluation
The performance of the system is measured by the time taken to fulfil user’s
requests on data streams.We compare the results with that of a system that
query directly to StreamBase DSMS, which is refer to as direct-query system.
Hardware Setup: The prototype system is deployed in a cloud-like environ-
ment. We make use of four machines in the experiments, which run data server,
StreamBase, proxy and client interface accordingly. Machines running server and
StreamBase are both IBM x3650 servers located in a server room and each has
two Quad-Core Intel Xeon E5450 processors and 32GB memory. The machine
running proxy is a mini work station and the client machine is one author’s
macbook. All machines are connected via University’s 100Mbps Intranet. The
StreamBase DSMS maintains a few real-time data streams from various projects,
such as weather data feeds from a number of mini weather stations producing
weather records at one minute interval.There are also GPS track information
from personal mobile devices.
Workloads:Workloads are formed by sequences of continuous queries. Each
continuous query corresponds to three files in the experiment: (1)a StreamSQL
script as the input to direct-query system;(2)a XACML policy file whose obli-
gations forms the query graph exactly as that in the above StreamSQL script.
This file will be loaded into eXACML+ to provide access control policies to
PDP;(3)a XACML request file for requesting data streams from eXACML+,
which may also have user query embedded inside. The request file contains cre-
dentials, resources and actions as specified in the corresponding policy so that
PDP will always permit the request so that PEP can generate query graphs
from obligations and user queries. The actual specifications of each query graph
are generated randomly, but we make sure that parameter names are consis-
tent with those in stream schemas of so that every query graph generated from
PEP is valid. In this experiment, we form query graphs with a pre-defined set of
combinations for Filter(FB), Map(MB) and Aggregation (AB) operators. The
sequence of continuous queries follow two set up: (1) Each continuous query and
corresponding request appears only once (i.e. is unique) in the sequence;(2)The
sequence follows Zipf distribution, which models the scenario where a small num-
ber of popular streams are requested frequently. Such request pattern is popular
in P2P file-sharings and web caching [10,11] and we use it to verify the perfor-
mance improvement brought by cache mechanism on query graphs in proxy. The
parameters used to generate the workloads are illustrated in Table 3 .
Variable Value Description
nDirectQueries 1500 number of direct queries
directQueryDist 160:170:130:124:254:290:372 query graph composition (Single FB : Single MB
: Single AB : FB+MB : FB+AB : MB+AB :
FB+MB+AB)
nPolicies 1000 number of unique policies
nRequests 1500 number of matching requests
α 0.223 skew parameter for Zipf distribution
maxRank 300 maximum rank of unique requests from which
Zipf distribution is generated
Table 3. Summary of parameters used experiments
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Fig. 6. Overall Performance
Experiments: We measure system performance in terms of time taken to
fulfil authorized data stream requests. Apparently, access control frameworks
incur additional overhead when handling request from users. However, as we
will show in the results, the overhead of the framework is consistent most of
the time and cache mechanism implemented in proxy does help improve the
overall performance. Before any user request is made, we need to load policies
onto the data servers so that PDP can make decisions based on them. Loading a
policy onto server takes a small amount of time without respect to the number
of policies already loaded. The average loading time is 0.25 second with standard
deviation of 0.06 second.
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Fig. 7. Detailed Processing Time of AC Requests
Figure 6(a) presents the result obtained by running the unique query/request
sequence. Different from eXACML, there are no actual data transferred in the
system and most direct queries and most requests to eXACML+ can get re-
sponse very quickly,i.e.,less than one second. The response time for direct query
is consistent most of the time, which is reasonable as only the query graphs,in
forms of StreamSQL scripts, and data stream handles, in the form of URIs, are
exchanged between the direct query system and DSMS. Given a constant envi-
ronment in terms of network condition, computational power, etc., the response
time should not vary much. eXACML+ incurs overheads and the curve is less
smooth compared to that of direct query system. We believe it is mainly because
of additional network traffic among clients, proxies and servers, which occupies
about two thirds of the total response time. The cost for communication between
multiple entities is also less predictive and subject to charge with large variance.
Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) represent the detailed elapsed time for processing
100 and 1500 AC requests with eXACML+, respectively. We can see that time
taken to make access control decisions and to manipulate query graphs take less
than 0.01 second in all requests and are rather consistent despite the increment
number of requests and loaded policies, which are 50 for 7(a) and 1000 for 7(b).
Response time of sending query graphs to DSMS occupies one third of the total
response time on average and has much larger variance. We notice that there
are a few cases where sending query graphs to DSMS take much longer time
than average and these cases take place only in the beginning of the request
sequences. We believe this is due to the behaviour of StreamBase API, which
needs longer time to establish initial connections to StreamBase than to send
subsequence queries. In general, the response time for eXACML+ to process AC
requests is consistent for over 99% of the requests, which verifies that the whole
system is scalable with respect to number of requests processed and number of
polices loaded
Figure 6(b) shows how the overhead changes when the proxy enables caching.
Although eXACML+ does not outperform direct query systems, the performance
improvement brought by caching is substantial. Unlike eXACML, what cached
in the proxy is not actual data, but data stream handles, whose sizes are sig-
nificantly smaller. The performance improvement thus is not as obvious as in
[4]. Nevertheless, caching leads to over 100% improvement over non-cached re-
quests for nearly 40% of the number of quests and at least 10% improvement for
the rest requests. The results justify the importance to have cache mechanism
implemented in proxy when the request distribution is heavy-tailed.
5 Related Work
There are a couple of cloud-based systems that aim to provide data sharing
capabilities across the Internet. Dropbox[12] and iCloud[13] are examples of
commercial products that enables file sharing among individual devices bases
on their cloud storage back-end. SenseWeb[14] and SensorBase[15], on the other
hand, allows users to upload the share their sensor data. Theses systems support
coarse-grained access control model in which an user either makes his data public,
shares with a list of people or just keeps it private. They cannot deal with the
access control scenarios we considered in this paper and in [4].
In recently years, Time-series data, or stream data management systems
have been developed substantially. So far the most renowned commercial DSMS,
StreamBase [2], was evolved from famous Aurora system[6] and its distributed
version borealis[16]. Enforce access control on data streams is still a fresh topic
in the research community. Carminati et al. [17], [18] proposed model and frame-
work for enforcing access control over stream data. Rimma, et al. [19], [20] pro-
posed to make use of embedded punctuations in the data stream to enforce access
control, while Lindner. et al.[21], [22] proposed to build an additional static layer
on top of query engines. All these approaches are built on coarse-grained access
control models and lack of capability to deal with the scenario where fine-grained
policies are needed.
Using of XACML[1] in Cloud systems is yet to receive further development.
[23] uses XACML in grid environment where its role is to unify database access
control mechanisms from multiple parties. We foresee that XACML will be more
widely used in the industry as it’s the current OASIS standard and is continu-
ously evolving in response to new access control requirements. To the best of our
knowledge, our work in this paper is the first to use XACML model to enforce
fine-grained access control policies over stream data.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed eXACML+ facilitating data stream owners
to share their data streams with other users in a secure and flexible manner
over a trusted cloud infrastructure. The main challenges were owing to the vital
differences between bounded data (as in RDBMS) and unbounded stream data
(DSMS). We also explore the problem of possible privacy leak by allowing a single
user to have access to multiple aggregated streams of one master data stream.
We also show in the paper how to effectively detect if a user query will return
empty or only partial result due to mismatches with access control policies. We
have implemented the prototype eXACML+ system over the Aurora data-model
based StreamBase data stream management system. Preliminary experiment
results show our framework’s efficacy. It incurs constant and consistent overhead
compared with direct queries (without access control) on the data stream engine.
Our immediate plans are to migrate the framework to commercial Cloud
environments such as Amazon EC2 [24] and Microsoft’s Azure [25] for more
comprehensive evaluations with practical workloads instead of synthetic ones.
Moreover, we intend to use other stream base engine like APE [26] and DB2
DSE [27] to broaden the range of applications that our framework supports.
On the conceptual front, relaxing the trusted cloud model to incorporate more
accountability mechanisms is our primary next challenge.
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